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*Comp. Law. 41 Since the introduction of the new derivative claim there have been six derivative
proceedings in England. This article looks at the new two-stage derivative claim under these cases on
issues relating to the assessment of s.263(3)(b) of the Companies Act 2006, whether there is a need
to establish a prima facie case and issues relating to corporate social responsibility in derivative
claims.
Introduction: the new derivative claim
In 1997 the Law Commission published a report on shareholders' remedies and concluded that the
rule in Foss v Harbottle 1 was complicated and unwieldy; certain terms were not clear such as
“wrongdoer control”; and that having members try to establish standing easily resulted in a mini-trial
which increased the length and cost of such cases.2 The Commission concluded that derivative
claims needed reform to reflect more “modern flexible and accessible criteria for determining whether
a shareholder can pursue an action”,3 with the aim of allowing cases to continue in appropriate
circumstances.4
Derivative claims now come under Pt 11 of the Companies Act 2006. The scope for a claim was
extended to include negligence and any breach of duty committed by a director.5 Previously one
would have to show fraud on the minority or acts which were ultra vires, which has now gone. Further
problems included ratification and wrongdoer control, which the Government was keen to remove.6
The old rule in Foss 7 was seen as restrictive and the lack of a personal remedy meant derivative
claims were rare and shareholders tended to opt for an unfairly prejudicial claim.8
From parliamentary discussions it was clear directors were concerned that the increased scope, the
introduction of the new directors' duties and the reduced possibility of ratification9 would lead to
increased shareholder litigation. Lord Goldsmith demonstrated that the new derivative claim would be
a delicate balancing act, stating that directors should be able to take business decisions in good faith
but also allow shareholders to bring meritorious claims against directors but have unmeritorious
claims dismissed at the earliest possible stage.10 Hannigan reiterated the point, saying that there must
be a balance between promoting higher standards and not deterring people from accepting
directorships.11 The fear was that if directors became subject to frivolous claims, people would be
unwilling to accept directorships. Bainbridge argues in a US context that “the system of corporate
governance is designed to function largely without shareholder input”,12 which is echoed in the Law
Commission's guiding principle that there should be a freedom from shareholder interference.13 There
is also the concept of “the business judgment rule”; although not a strict legal rule, it is the idea that
judges are not there to second-guess business decisions14 and by allowing more derivative claims it
was feared that courts would be more prone to do so.15 Although the Government believed there were
already sufficient safeguards in place to protect from frivolous claims,16 they felt the need to respond
to these concerns, and the end result was a two-stage test for claimants to pass in a derivative claim.
This two-stage process will be the focus point of discussion, drawing on key recent cases. The first
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stage involves the claimant establishing a prima facie case, e.g. the case is one of breach of duty,
whether there is some evidence to support it, etc. Hannigan believes that a derivative claim is unlikely
to be stopped at the first stage:
*Comp. Law. 42 “Faced with a new procedure designed to make derivative actions more accessible
… the courts may be reluctant to throw out a remotely plausible case at the first threshold.”17
The second stage contains a non-exhaustive list18 of factors the judge must consider and goes
beyond establishing a prima facie case.19 There are also mandatory bars to claims which may
become apparent during the assessment, which include the court refusing the claim if a person acting
in accordance with s.172 would not seek to continue the claim or if the act or omission has been
authorised or ratified.20
This article will analyse potential shortcomings of the new derivative claims and whether the new
claim is meeting the objectives of the reform under three headings: prima facie case and a mandatory
bar; the second stage--s.263(3); and corporate social responsibility (which will be covered in Pt 2 of
this article appearing in the next issue of the journal). In determining whether the new claim is
meeting the objectives of the reform it will be necessary to focus on the new case law. Cases such as
Iesini, 21 Franbar Holdings Ltd v Patel 22 and Stimpson v Southern Landlords Association 23 will be
particularly scrutinised and there will also be particular mention of two other statutory derivative
claims, those of Mission Capital Plc v Sinclair 24 and Kiani v Cooper. 25 It is important to remember
that although certain aspects of a case may have been interpreted incorrectly that is not to mean the
decision to allow/deny the derivative claim was incorrect since all the factors must be taken together.
Establishing a prima facie case and the mandatory bar
At the first stage the applicant must establish that there is a prima facie case, and the court must also
look to see whether there is a mandatory bar. As Hannigan mentioned, the courts may be reluctant to
throw out a claim at the first stage. This raises the point as to whether there is a need for establishing
a prima facie case and how it has been operating in practice so far.
The intentions of Parliament were clear: they wished frivolous claims to be dismissed at the earliest
possible stage, without involving the company,26 and arguably the underlying fundamental principle
was “efficiency and cost effectiveness”27 as they wished to avoid hearings turning into mini-trials.28 To
see whether the new statutory derivative claim is achieving these goals we must look at how the first
stage has been functioning. The cases do offer some guidance as to how matters are developing and
whether there appears to be any linear development. Roberts and Poole note that since derivative
claims are based on leave and judicial control, “it seems to automatically follow that this mechanism is
unlikely to result in reduced costs and time saving”.29 We shall first look at establishing a prima facie
case.
Prima facie case
Keay and Loughrey wrote that before 2006 the concept “prima facie” was well known but the meaning
remained elusive. It was suggested one would have to show that a substantial chance of success is
likely in the final hearing, which suggested the inevitability of there being some consideration of the
ultimate merits of the case that could result in a mini-trial. They go on to note, though, that these
conclusions may be unwarranted.30
The history of common law derivative claims illustrates that point and also that passing the first stage
in terms of establishing a prima facie case may be a relatively low hurdle.31 Since no evidence is
required by the other side and evidence from the applicant may be “very flimsy”32 or “rudimentary”,33
the courts may be understandably reluctant to throw out a case at the first stage. It is conceivable that
the test of establishing a prima facie case is merely establishing more than a 0 per cent chance of
success. This is the approach taken by the Australian *Comp. Law. 43 courts34 which is taken from
the American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd case.35 In Australian Broadcasting Corp v Lenah Game
Meat 36 it was stated:
“… [I]t is inappropriate to consider in any detail the standard of probability of the plaintiff's case. It is
enough at this stage that the issue is ‘triable’ or ‘arguable’.”37
This assumption may be rebutted by the case of Smith v Croft (No.2), 38 where permission was
refused on the grounds that they had not established a prima facie case on a number of issues but
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had on others. This was due to independent expert evidence from the auditors--courts have also
thrown out cases in other instances on the evidence from independent experts.39
The Law Commission was originally critical of the prima facie requirement. They were reluctant to
have a case falling either side of an invisible line and being decided on its legal merits.40 Table 1
demonstrates that case law is developing in a way that suggests the need for a prima facie test is
unfounded:
Table 1: Prima facie
decisions
Prima facie case
Case Yes No Reason
Fanmailuk • Not contested
Franbar • Defendant conceded
Iesini • Interim permission
Kiani • Interim permission
Mission Capital • Not discussed/Not a
duplicative claim
Stimpson • Unduly elaborate
As Table 1 shows, it is clear that the test for establishing a prima facie case is still undeniably low. In
Stimpson the judge believed it would be unduly elaborate to consider whether there was a prima facie
case41 and in Franbar neither party attempted to establish or contest the issue.42 Keay and Loughrey
in a later article argue that Stimpson sets the bar dangerously high in relation to a prima facie case,
noting that the judge believed establishing a prima facie case required addressing the factors under
s.263 of the Companies Act 2006.43 With respect, this is an unfounded argument. The relationship the
court drew in its assessment was between s.263(2)(a) and s.263(3), rather than s.261 and s.263 as
Keay and Loughrey suggest, and Stimpson clearly shows, is a low threshold for establishing a prima
facie case. Only in Iesini and Kiani has prima facie really been mentioned and only in Iesini was any
framework really laid out regarding what is required to establish a prima facie case.44
In Mission Capital, although the first stage was passed with relative ease, it was concluded on the
basis of s.263(2)(a) and not on establishing a prima facie case. The court believed the relevant part of
establishing a prima facie case was s.263(2)(a). They stated there would be a mandatory bar if the
claim had been purely duplicative of the counterclaim. A prima facie case and s.263(2)(a) are two
different considerations, as a mandatory bar may be used at any point in the second stage and also,
its primary purpose is not to determine whether or not there is a prima facie case. It is possible for
there to be a prima facie case even if there is still no director wishing to continue. However, it would
not be possible for a case to continue where a director would want to continue but there was no prima
facie case. If s.263(2)(a) was the relevant section to establishing a prima facie case, Keay and
Loughrey would have been correct in their assessment of the first stage in relation to Stimpson ; but
as we have just seen, s.263(2)(a) may be used at any time.
With all this in mind it would be beneficial for all those involved to skip the first stage. Since most
claims involve small private companies, the reduction of costs resulting from not having to go through
establishing a prima facie case may encourage more people to bring meritorious claims; but with
sufficient safeguards at the second stage this will sufficiently protect against frivolous claims. It would
also not disadvantage anyone claiming in cases of public companies, since disgruntled minority
shareholders would most likely sell their shares.45 Alternatively, if shareholders had the incentive to
bring a claim, the company would have the option of attempting to produce independent evidence to
refute what they are claiming. Cases such as Stimpson, Franbar and Mission Capital have already
seen a move towards this approach.46
*Comp. Law. 44 The mandatory bar
Now we must look to the assessment under s.263(2)(a) of the Companies Act. It is important to
remember that these are two separate considerations under Pt 11 although there may be some
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overlap.47 It may be possible for the court to skip the prima facie case and start with s.263(2)(a) for a
number of reasons, such as in the recent cases where the defendants concede there is a prima facie
case,48 the judge considers it unduly elaborate,49 both parts are heard together50 or it is unopposed.51
This section serves as a new element to the second stage,52 and Keay and Loughrey demonstrate it
could result in a claim ultimately being decided on its merits.53 This was not favoured by the Law
Commission as it feared the leave stage would develop into a detailed investigation.54 Whether this
section actually requires anything more than what is covered under establishing a prima facie case is
now being revealed under the new cases. In Iesini the court stated that:
“[S]ection 263(2)(a) will apply only where the court is satisfied that no director acting in accordance
with section 172 would seek to continue the claim”.55
It will also be important to establish how this test should be assessed.
It is arguable that when considering s.263(2)(a), although establishing a prima facie case may only
require more than 0 per cent chance of success, it would be a struggle to satisfy this section if there
was only a 1 per cent chance of success. It is likely no director would seek to pursue a claim with




Case Yes No Reason
Fanmailuk • Not discussed
Franbar • Room for more than
one view on the facts
Iesini • Legal claim very weak
Kiani • Many factual disputes
Mission Capital • Claim not duplicative
Stimpson • Benefits negated by
detriments
This ultimately leads this section to be decided on its merits, which Parliament was keen to avoid
since they did not want cases falling either side of an invisible line.56 Stimpson illustrates this point
well. Here, the judge threw out the case under s.263(2)(a), noting that there were chances of success
in areas and some money might be recoverable, but on a balancing of the facts the court still ruled
that no director acting in accordance with s.172 would seek to continue.57 Here we can see that
although there was clearly a prima facie case, no director would seek to continue the claim, marking
the notable difference between a prima facie case and s.263(2)(a). Table 2 and Stimpson
demonstrate the ability of s.263(2)(a) to filter out frivolous claims at a better rate than the
requirements for a prima facie case.
However, in Iesini four days were spent deliberating over independent expert evidence and legal
issues in the assessment of s.263(2)(a), which eventually led to the conclusion there was no breach
of duty in question and it was impossible to say whether there was negligence. Although evidence
showed there was clearly no chance of success, that assessment still developed into a mini-trial. The
question arising seems to be whether it is worth having to establish a prima facie case owing to the
time it adds to the claim or whether you should begin with s.263(2)(a). It is true that not all factors will
take four days to assess, but this is argued to be an unavoidable factor in derivative proceedings as
demonstrated by Roberts and Poole. Owing to the flexibility of the courts not all cases will now
deteriorate into lengthy mini-trials, which can be seen from Kiani where the parties curtailed their
arguments, although the proceedings still lasted a day58 ; and also in Franbar the court merely
mentioned that there was room for more than one view in its assessment of s.263(2)(a) before
moving on to s.263(3).59 No case has yet to stretch to any length as seen pre-2006,60 but the statutory
claim is still young.
*Comp. Law. 45 Reisberg also highlights that it is unlikely a case will be so poorly formulated that it
will not survive the court's analysis in the first stage.61 This evidence points towards starting with
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s.263(2)(a) rather than a seemingly redundant need to establish a prima facie case.
The actual assessment of s.263(2)(a) is not vastly different from that of the second stage in
s.263(3)(b), and as mentioned earlier in Stimpson, the court saw a relationship between assessing
this section and the second stage. To digress slightly, the key difference between s.263(2)(a) and
s.263(3)(b) is not between these sections themselves, but the other subsections under s.263(3). We
will see later that assessing s.263(2)(a) and s.263(3)(b) is mainly carried out on a basis of legal
validity, except in a clear case where commercial considerations may be included. If the legal claim is
very weak, as in Iesini, then s.263(2)(a) will apply. If the claim has some legal merit to it as in Franbar,
the court will move on to the second stage and may attach weight to the claim based on the strength
of the legal claim. In allowing the claim to proceed, all the other factors must be considered under
s.263(3), such as the availability of another remedy, and the court must decide at its discretion
whether to allow the claim based on all the considerations.62 Here we can see there is no great
difference between s.263(2)(a) and establishing a prima facie case, other than there being evidence
from the defendants. There is, however, a difference between a prima facie case and s.263(3),
contrary to the views of Keay and Loughrey.63
As a starting point Iesini stated that s.263(2)(a) will only apply where no director would seek to
continue the claim. Iesini also noted that although there may be certain commercial considerations to
take in to account, a court would be ill-equipped to consider them except in a clear case.64 Here the
court preferred to stay within the confines of the law to determine whether no director would continue
the claim demonstrating there was no breach of duty and where it was impossible to say whether
there was negligence. What a clear case actually is may be difficult to determine but arguably,
Stimpson is such as case.65 Since the company was limited by guarantee its objectives were easier to
decide; however, that decision might have not been so easy had the company been limited by shares.
Other issues such as the existence of independent evidence and whether the company has any
money may also lead to mandatory bars. Each factor alone--or even coupled together--may not mean
a mandatory bar; however, the existence of any factor, as we will see later, may lead a court still to
decide that a director would attach little weight to continuing a claim because of it.
In summary, it would seem there is little need to establish a prima facie case, or as put in Stimpson
“unduly elaborate”.66 There is no great difference between establishing a prima facie case and
s.263(2)(a); and removing the need to establish a prima facie case will progress towards achieving
the goals of Pt 11--cost effectiveness and efficiency--which would be especially beneficial to small
private companies. It is argued that a more appropriate test as a means of achieving efficiency is to
merely establish whether no director would continue the claim. If this is so, then permission should be
denied. Even though this means a case is still decided on its merits, it is arguably more efficient than
doing both (as demonstrated by the tables above) and also unavoidable, as reasoned by Roberts and
Poole.
How the courts will assess s.263(2)(a) is not entirely clear, but this does not lead to intolerable
uncertainty as Stimpson and Iesini do offer guidance. If the legal claims are very weak or it is a clear
case on commercial reasoning, it will be dismissed. Guidance can also be taken from issues relating
to establishing a prima facie case such as where there is the existence of independent expert
evidence or the state of finances of the company.67 This assessment would still allow frivolous claims
to be stopped at the earliest possible stage, but the court would nevertheless retain the ability to strike
a claim out at any time if it becomes apparent that no director acting in accordance with s.172 would
seek to continue. This is also in conjunction with the fact that there are already natural safeguards to
prevent from frivolous claims and thus it must be concluded that the need to establish a prima facie
case is surplus to requirements. Removal of the prima facie requirements would also not require any
greater involvement from the company at an earlier stage since the onus is on the applicant to show
that directors would seek to continue the claim and independent evidence may be sought without the
interference in the day-to-day business.
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